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In a human-in-the-loop simulation, two air traffic controllers managed identical airspace 
while burdened with higher than average workload, and while using advanced tools and 
automation designed to assist with scheduling aircraft on multiple arrival flows to a single 
meter fix. This paper compares the strategies employed by each controller, and investigates 
how the controllers’ strategies change while managing their airspace under more normal 
workload conditions and a higher workload condition. Each controller engaged in different 
methods of maneuvering aircraft to arrive on schedule, and adapted their strategies to cope 
with the increased workload in different ways. Based on the conclusions three suggestions 
are made: that quickly providing air traffic controllers with recommendations and 
information to assist with maneuvering and scheduling aircraft when burdened with 
increased workload will improve the air traffic controller’s effectiveness, that the tools 
should adapt to the strategy currently employed by a controller, and that training should 
emphasize which traffic management strategies are most effective given specific airspace 
demands. 
Nomenclature 
ATC = Air Traffic Control 
CPA = closest point of approach 
D-side = Radar-associate 
FAA = Federal Aviation Administration 
LOS = loss of separation 
MACS = Multi Aircraft Control System 
NAS = National Airspace System 
TRACON = Terminal Radar Approach Control 
I. Introduction 
EXTGEN is a plan envisioned by the FAA to advance the state of the NAS. NextGen aims to create an air 
transport and travel environment which is safe, convenient, predictable, and environmentally friendly.
1
 
NextGen will develop and implement new technologies, concepts of operations, and supporting infrastructures 
capitalizing on existing technologies, some of which have previously been implemented as a result of work in 
NextGen.  
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NextGen is a massive endeavor to look at every aspect affecting the safety, efficiency, predictability, and 
environmental factors which might impact the NAS. This includes everything from streamlining and improving 
individual avionics components to coordinating and predicting the movement of thousands of aircraft on a daily 
basis. Of course, with every change made, its effects on other parts of the system must be taken into account. 
Furthermore, as a vital component, humans must interact seamlessly within the system and with the system. Systems 
must account for, and take advantage of, strengths and weaknesses of human performance and experience, as well as 
differences which exist between individuals.  
The general purpose of this exercise is to better understand the implication of controllers’ individualized 
techniques and strategies for managing aircraft, while using NextGen tools and automation, under conditions of 
elevated demand. Before discussing the differences in strategy and implications on the implementation of tools and 
automation in NextGen, a discussion on why this comparison might be of interest.  
With research involving human participants, it is generally understood that every person differs from the next. 
An individual’s unique combination of cultural experiences, intelligence, stress, diligence, visual acuity, muscle 
reflexes, just to name a few, are going to shape his/her interaction with the system. In the context of an ATC 
environment, a single problem space may be resolved with more than one solution.
2
 For example, sector 
configuration, traffic characteristics, workload, etc. require strategies that minimize the likelihood of controller 
overload or an unsafe event.
3,4
 There is also literature discussing the types of clearances controllers use to manage 
aircraft
5
 as well as different tools and automation which may be used in NextGen ATC environments.
6
 These 
strategies employed by controllers might also vary as a combination of factors. That is, two controllers may use the 
tools identically under normal circumstances, but when workload increases, or some other factor changes, the 
strategies of the two controllers may deviate, or vice versa. 
Regarding the differences in individualized use of automation, Ref. 7 presented evidence that strong differences 
were found between pilots’ strategies for using autopilot in a multitask environment. Specifically, among five pilots, 
three completely different strategies were developed for managing the use of the autopilot systems, none of which 
were predicted or intended by the autopilot designers. Similarly, research has shown the use of data communications 
by flight crews and ATCs
8,9
 corresponds with an increase in visual and manual workload, and a decrease in auditory 
and speech workload. This research lends itself to the idea that when developing tools and automation for use by 
ATCs, it is important to understand how they will be used and that different strategies elicited by individual ATCs 
can lead to differences in performance. 
One of the biggest concerns in developing tools and automation to assist controllers in their objectives is that of 
the high demand situation. Of course, tools and automation should improve safety, performance, workload, etc. 
during normal operations, but during times of elevated demand, or when demand on controllers is highest, tools and 
automation should improve performance and decrease workload, and at least not hinder safety. Another important 
implication for the research presented in this paper was addressed by Ref. 10. Their research gave evidence for the 
ability of ATCs to adapt, or switch strategies, as a response to different levels of mental workload in a simulated 
ATC environment. This indicates that, not only should designers be concerned about how tools and automation will 
be used, but also when they will be used. Therefore, in analyzing the results of this experiment, a goal is to 
determine how to conduct future research to assist in the design and development of NextGen tools and automation, 
or train for their use, to best assist controllers in their objectives, during high demand situations.  
Perhaps, learning more about how and when controllers choose to implement different strategies can assist in 
determining training methods for controllers, or provide support for designing tools and automation that work 
effectively regardless of which strategies are being used. Another paper also makes recommendations for tool and 
automation development based on ATC strategies observed in the same experiment as the present paper: instead 
with a spotlight on 14 experimental trials, regardless of difficulty or workload.
11
 A third paper gives a more general 
overview of the experiment and provides findings from a priori conditions.
12
  
The human-in-the-loop experiment required ATCs to manage aircraft in en route sectors which feed Atlanta 
TRACON with arrivals to Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. The ATCs were given decision support 
tools and automation to assist in their tasks, but gave voice commands to aircraft flying within their sector. The 
original concept of the experiment is to determine levels of acceptable trajectory prediction error caused by errors in 
forecast winds and aircraft performance when en route controllers use tools and automation associated with 
trajectory prediction to assist in spacing arrival aircraft to a point, also called a meter fix.  
Given the ability of ATCs to adapt to the difficulty of the task environment, and their predisposition to use the 
same tools and automation to a different effect and degree, an attempt is made in this paper to discuss and present 
the data of two specific controllers, while they managed identical airspace, over the course of one trial. The trial 
chosen was only one of seventeen trials using the same tools and automation; albeit with different levels of error 
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built into the trajectory predictions, per experimental design. Trial 16 is selected for this investigation for its high 
demand. 
The two chosen controllers, each controlling identical sectors with identical traffic scenarios, were selected 
because observers noted during the course of the experiment that they often chose to use the information provided 
by the tools and automation differently and strategically managed aircraft in different ways. As an example from 
several observations, controller “Alpha” preferred to use the graphical route construction tool to work out a 
complete route, and then transmit the name of each waypoint to the pilot. Controller “Zulu” would on occasion, turn 
an aircraft toward a heading, and then turn the aircraft back after some time. 
There are some expected differences when comparing the results of these two controllers during the 
experimental trials. The results in this report focus on objective measures of performance and efficiency, and some 
subjective measures of workload. These will provide insight into the ways controllers are affected during times of 
elevated difficulty. Expected, is some form of validation that notes made by observers are reflected by measures 
recorded during the simulation. That is to say, that these two controllers did in fact control aircraft and utilize the 
tools and suggestions made by automation in different ways, at least part of the time. Just as an example, but in line 
with what was observed during the experiment, Zulu may regularly command more heading changes, or Alpha 
might take the time to construct each route and instruct the crew to update their flight plan to cross each waypoint in 
the constructed flight plan. Another interesting aspect is the safety, efficiency, and performance differences for each 
of these controllers; comparing, for instance, the average distance travelled through their respective sectors or the 
average separation between aircraft within the sector.   
The current work provides a first look into how individual controller strategies for managing traffic might affect 
safety, workload, efficiency, and performance when using NextGen-like tools and automation during high demand 
situations. Developing tools and automation, and training controllers to effectively deal with high demand situations 
helps ensure that stringent safety standards are met. In a system which is already one of the most complex in the 
world, and becoming ever-more complex, differences in strategies between controllers may make a large impact on 
the safety and efficacy of the system.  
II. Methods 
A. Participants 
Twelve retired, radar-certified ATCs participated in the present simulation, and were monetarily compensated 
for their participation. One of the controllers is female, and all have normal or corrected to normal vision. Each 
experimental world consists of two experimental ATCs managing arrival and overflight aircraft travelling through 
their sector. A single experimental controller handles traffic in a “High” sector, which feeds descending arrivals to a 
single controller managing the “Low” sector. The two confederate ghost ATCs in a world manage aircraft in sectors 
surrounding the experimental sectors, adding realism and dynamism to the simulation environment. Lastly, the two 
D-side controllers in each world are tasked with recording real-time actions and judgments of automation use, made 
by the experimental controllers. The D-side controllers also assist the experimental controllers with making and 
taking aircraft handoffs to and from the surrounding sectors. Two identical worlds were implemented to double the 
amount of data collected during the experiment. 
B. Apparatus 
A simulation world is created by using MACS software to simulate ground-side and air-side operations in the 
NAS.
13
 Equipment used by the ATCs during the experiment is chosen to closely replicate the look and feel of 
equipment used at FAA traffic management facilities. The scenarios were modified from historical real-world 
traffic, wind, and route data to meet requirements of the experimental design. The two identical simulation worlds 
are run in parallel and are fully independent of each other. Voice communication equipment is utilized, enabling 
voice communications between the pseudo-pilots and ATCs. 
The controllers were able to utilize tools to assist with their usual sector tasks as well as aircraft schedule 
conformance at the meter fix. The tools referred to in this paper refer to those tools which assist in the maneuvering 
of aircraft. For example, a participant in this paper is said to use tools when giving instructions for reroute requires 
the pilot to update the flight plan of the aircraft. The controller is able to determine this updated flight plan by 
dragging the graphical depiction of the aircraft’s flight plan to waypoints which “snap” the flight plan into place, or 
by requesting the automation provide an updated route which conforms to the scheduled time of arrival. The 
controller is able to determine how the flight plan affects schedule conformance by a time displayed near the aircraft 
symbol, which depicts how early or late the aircraft will arrive at the meter fix if flying directly to that point from 
the current position. On the other hand, when not using tools, a controller would, instead of using the graphical 
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reroute tool to issue route clearances to the aircraft, instruct the flight crew to fly off course using headings. Once 
the controller believes the aircraft conforms to the schedule, by seeing the schedule conformance time near the 
aircraft symbol, the controller would then give a final course clearance toward the meter fix.  
When using and not using the tools, as defined in this paper, both controllers can “probe” the automation for 
recommendations regarding route, altitude, and speed. The difference is the method by which they handle the 
reroute. The tool using controller would be more likely to update the computer with the recommendations provided 
by the tools, and transmit those instructions to the aircraft; while the non-tool using controller would be more likely 
to not adjust the flight plan of the aircraft, issue headings until heading to the meter fix, then updating the host 
computer once on a direct path out of their sector. 
Using the graphical reroute tool also provides conflict feedback. If altering the flight plan of an aircraft results in 
a conflict with another aircraft, the aircraft and point of conflict are displayed. Additionally, a conflict list is 
provided which displays a list of currently conflicting aircraft and time to LOS. Lastly, a number is displayed next to 
the callsign of an aircraft which is in conflict with another aircraft. This number depicts the time in minutes to LOS. 
C. Workload Queries 
Online workload queries were included to measure subjective workload of the experimental ATCs. These real-
time queries were presented every 3 minutes during the simulation, but would “time-out” after 20-seconds with no 
response from the ATC. Each query was presented at the top of their MACS display, coupled with an audible 
“ding”. Before the experiment began the ATCs were given the following instructions regarding the meaning of each 
of the ratings on the scale: 1=very low workload, very little traffic, hardly anything to do, time to talk; 2=low 
workload, light traffic, time to give best routes, time to talk; 3=somewhat low workload, in the groove, firm grasp of 
the flick, proactively looking for conflicts, still provide services; 4=somewhat high workload, mostly in the groove, 
still have the flick, proactive most of the time but focusing more on the separation management over providing 
services or other tasks with less priority; 5=high workload, having trouble keeping the flick, working reactively 
instead of proactively, relying heavily on automation tools; 6=very high workload, on the verge of losing the flick, 
reactive and scramble mode, falling behind in routing tasks, cannot take on any additional tasks.  
Questionnaires were also proctored after each trial, which include questions related to workload (see Appendix). 
The questions ask the ATCs to rate their workload during the busiest portion of the trial on different factors. The 
ATCs responded on factors related to their mental activity, time pressure, frustration, and overall success with 
aircraft separation, on a scale from 1 – 7. With 1 being “Very Low” or “Not At All”, 4 being “Moderate”, and 7 
being “Very High”.  
D. Procedure 
All ATCs were given training prior to the experiment. They gained familiarity with their sector’s traffic patterns, 
rules, and requirements, as well as the advanced tools and concepts that would be used during the experimental 
trials. Each of the trials during the experimental phase lasted approximately 55 minutes. After each trial was 
complete, the ATCs completed a post-trial questionnaire. After all experimental trials were complete the ATCs then 
completed a more exhaustive post-simulation questionnaire.  
Each controller managing an experimental sector also had assistance with aircraft handoffs and sector planning 
from a D-side controller. Another task of the D-side controller was to log commands given by the experimental 
controller, and how close those commands approximated suggestions given by the automation. The general flow of 
aircraft was toward the Southeast, first from a confederate “Ghost” controller, to the “High” experimental sector, 
then the “Low” experimental sector, where the aircraft would cross the meter fix, and finally to another confederate 
Ghost controller. The arrival aircraft entering the High sector originated from the North and West. These aircraft, 
according to the discretion of the ATC, began their descent from cruise altitude within the High sector, before 
eventually being handed off to the Low sector. One of the primary goals for both High and Low controllers, after 
maintaining safe aircraft separation, is to deliver the aircraft to the meter fix to conform to the aircraft’s scheduled 
times: within a +/- 25s buffer time period, while maintaining standard separation. A speed and altitude restriction 
was part of the airspace configuration for the meter fix; however, due to the adjustment of speed to meet the arrival 
time, speed restrictions were often lifted for the meter fix.  
E. Design 
A quasi-experimental repeated measures design was employed in the current study, with various wind and 
performance error conditions. However, this paper looks in depth at a single higher workload scenario. This scenario 
incorporates “realistic” aircraft performance errors, and “realistic” wind speed errors. Therefore, understanding the 
error types and their relationship to trajectory prediction uncertainty is not relevant for the current paper. Again, 
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5 
interested parties can 
look at Ref. 12 for an 
overview of results 
regarding the primary 
experimental conditions 
for all trials. 
III. Results 
While four 
experimental controllers 
participated in the 
simulation experiment, 
most analyses and data 
presented focus on two 
controllers, referred to 
as Alpha and Zulu. 
Evidence is given which 
shows that the chosen 
trial had higher demand 
associated with 
managing traffic than 
many of the other 
experimental trials. Data 
is also presented which 
demonstrates that these 
two controllers do indeed use the tools and automation in both strategically and tactically different ways. However, 
the primary goal is to determine how controller strategy and tool use change in high demand situations. Fig. 1 shows 
the altitude, indicated by color, and trajectory plots of aircraft during trial 16, for each of the two ATCs. The 
managed sector consists of the larger, arrowhead shaped outline. At about where the aircraft plots change color to 
green is the location of the altitude in which the next ATC would gain aircraft control.  
Comparing each of the plots, it is apparent that the two ATCs engaged different strategies to manage their 
aircraft’s time to arrive at the meter fix. ATC Alpha descended the aircraft, the red to yellow color change, much 
further into the sector than ATC Zulu; while ATC Zulu directed the aircraft to descend almost immediately upon 
entering the airspace. The strategy employed by ATC Zulu allows the aircraft to fly slower without having to make 
such drastic route changes. This strategy is also likely more efficient, because the small turn off course, then turn 
back on course allows the pilots to idle the engines for longer in descent. With more turns and more level flight, 
more power is required to keep the aircraft flying at proper speed. Another advantage to the strategy of ATC Zulu is 
safety. The flight paths of aircraft from different inbound flows cross less often, thereby creating less opportunity for 
aircraft to come into close proximity. Following is further evidence for these claims, provided in the form of 
objective and subjective measures taken during the course of the experiment. 
A. Air Traffic Controller Action Events 
Action events were derived from actions made during the experiment by the ATCs regarding events such as, but 
not limited to, manipulating and executing changes made by the graphical trial planner and automation tools, 
assigning speed, turning off the conflict display, selecting an item within an aircraft’s data tag, displaying the current 
trial plan, sending a point-out, and setting a temporary altitude. Events which were excluded from data were actions 
made by the ATCs regarding transfer of aircraft control, minimizing and moving the aircraft’s datablock, and 
incorrectly input commands, such as typos and syntax errors. In Fig. 2, a graph depicts the number of action events 
taken in each trial by each ATC. There are two things gleaned from interpreting the data and subsequent graph. 
First, trial 16 shows a higher total number of action events (M = 583) compared with the average for the rest of the 
trials (M = 373.84). This provides the first step in verifying that trial 16 was indeed more difficult than many of the 
other experimental trials. Secondly, the data indicates that ATC Alpha (M = 431.29) typically executes more 
physical actions in the process of managing the sector’s airspace, compared with Zulu (M = 341).  This provides the 
first evidence towards verifying that the controllers employed different strategies while managing sector traffic. 
Figure 1. Aircraft plot of routes. These plots show ATC Alpha on left, and ATC Zulu 
on right. Color is a representation of altitude, with warmer colors indicating a higher 
altitude.  
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B. Clearance Types 
Another way to 
verify that differences 
exist between the 
strategies of the two 
controllers is to 
compare the types of 
clearances they issue. 
“Descend via” is a 
command given to an 
aircraft which instructs 
the crew to descend the 
aircraft according to 
specified charts. These 
charts specify normal 
procedures for altitude, 
speed, and waypoint 
crossing restrictions. 
  
 
Figure 2. Number of action events in each trial. This graph indicates the increase in 
action events for trial 16, and that ATC Alpha on average executed more action events 
than ATC Zulu. 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Alpha
Zulu
Trial 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
E
v
en
ts
 
 
 
Figure 3. Controller Strategy. These pie charts indicate the difference in strategy between controllers. ATC Alpha 
issued many clearances of each type during high workload, whereas ATC Zulu used speed, altitude, and heading. 
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When a descend via instruction is given, the aircraft will ideally descend through the airspace with little or no need 
for interaction with the ATCs. Similarly, the aircraft can be given instructions which include different waypoints, 
usually requiring them to turn off their previous route. When an ATC reads a route for the aircraft to fly, the aircraft 
will continue to descend to altitudes and at speeds which are congruent with the previously defined charts. For the 
purpose of this paper, this is regarded as being given a route clearance.  
The pie charts in Fig. 3 demonstrate some of the differences in strategy between ATC’s Alpha and Zulu. For 
many of the trials the modus operandi of ATC Alpha is to issue speeds and descend via instructions, with a limited 
number of altitude and route clearances. On the other hand, ATC Zulu issues many altitude clearances, followed by 
speeds, and finally some headings. This data indicates that both ATCs attempted to control the aircraft’s time to 
arrive at the meter fix using speeds, but the similarities stop there. Interesting to note is how the strategies of each 
controller changes from most of the trials compared with the more demanding trial. ATC Zulu gives many more 
heading changes in exchange for the comparative number of altitude changes. ATC Alpha on the other hand 
decreases the number of aircraft allowed to descend on the route as normal and speed changes, and increases the 
number of altitude and heading clearances. In order to burn more time off aircraft expected arrival time ATC Zulu 
used more airspace in the form of heading changes, which can indefinitely create more delay. ATC Alpha on the 
other hand probably felt as if using speed to meet the expected time of arrival was not drastic enough to make the 
changes necessary. It is interesting that Zulu decided to decrease the relative number of altitude clearances in the 
higher demand situation, while Alpha decided to increase the relative number of altitude clearances, and they both 
increased the number of heading clearances given. They both felt something more drastic was needed to create 
delay, but they responded in different ways.  
C. Aircraft Off-Route 
Another piece of information collected from the experimental runs is the number of times and amount of time 
per trial an aircraft was off-route. Any aircraft that is instructed to fly a heading is considered off-route. This is 
significant because observational recordings suggest ATC Alpha gave few headings, and therefore had few off-route 
aircraft, because Alpha preferred more often to instruct aircraft to fly to a particular fix, and to then continue their 
flight as previously indicated in their flight plan. ATC Zulu on the other hand, preferred to instruct aircraft to fly on 
a particular heading, putting that aircraft off-route. As expected, the off-route data collected give converging validity 
to the assertion that these observational notes are valid, as seen in Table 1.  
The off-route data presented also adds validity to the assumption that trial 16 elicits greater demand than many 
of the other trials. It is often quicker in the moment to instruct an aircraft to follow a heading. Then, worry about 
getting that aircraft back on 
course later, as opposed to 
constructing a valid route 
which matches 
requirements for meter fix 
arrival time and aircraft 
separation. Showing that 
both ATCs, especially 
Alpha, sent more aircraft 
on headings is evidence 
that there was greater time 
pressure managing airspace 
during that particular trial. 
D. Closest Point of Approach 
A common method of determining safety in a simulated ATC environment is to count LOSs. In en route airspace 
this is typically defined by an aircraft approaching another aircraft within 1000ft vertically and 5mi horizontally. 
This measure is hard to utilize in realistic simulations however, because LOSs rarely occur. Instead, the CPA, as 
operationalized for this paper, is defined as an aircraft which approaches another aircraft within 1000ft vertically and 
5-10mi horizontally. The assumption is that the closer together aircraft are the more difficult it will be to separate 
them, thus less safe. CPA also provides another way to verify that trial 16 is more difficult, on average, than the 
other experimental trials. Although the numbers are perhaps too close to postulate a real difference, the average 
number of CPA events in trial 16 (M = 3) is higher than the average number over the course of the rest of the trials 
(M = 1.97).  
 
 
average # of times off-
route 
average amount of time off-
route 
all ATC Alpha .94 181.88 
trials ATC Zulu 4.53 677.88 
both trial 16 10 1687.50 
controllers other trials 2.28 351.28 
ATC Alpha trial 16 5* 1120* 
ATC Zulu trial 16 15* 2255* 
Table 1. Aircraft off-route. This table compares the number of times and 
amount of time that aircraft were off-route during the trials and between 
controllers. *Not an average. 
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The average number of CPA events, combining all trials, for ATC Alpha (M = 2.59) is higher than that of ATC 
Zulu (M = 1.47), with 4 CPA events for Alpha and 2 CPA events for Zulu in trial 16. This number may be more 
difficult to interpret, though. There are many reasons Alpha could have a greater number of CPA events than Zulu. 
Perhaps, Alpha’s strategy allows for better prediction of aircraft location and use of airspace, without worrying 
about aircraft proximity. Possibly, Alpha had a set-it and forget-it strategy, causing aircraft to occasionally come 
unexpectedly close to other aircraft. However, based on the plots in Fig. 1, it seems more likely that ATC Alpha was 
forced to use more airspace because of the employed strategy. Using airspace to absorb delay, rather than using 
altitude, naturally causes aircraft to come into closer proximity. Without making any declaration of unsafe 
circumstances regarding the strategy of ATC Alpha, it seems that the potential is there for the strategy of ATC Zulu 
to be safer. 
E. Path Distance 
The distance travelled by aircraft within controllers’ airspace can help determine if differences exist between 
strategies, in terms of efficiency. Given identical scenarios, if the paths aircraft fly have greater distances in one case 
versus another, it can usually be assumed that when aircraft fly a greater distance more fuel is burned, and is more 
costly. Visual inspection of the plots provided in Fig. 1 might lead to the assumption that in this trial ATC Alpha 
controlled aircraft in a less efficient manner than ATC Zulu. However, presenting path distance numbers will help to 
verify this assertion. 
There are a couple notes to mention regarding flight path distance for these results. First, the flight path distance 
reported here starts at an equidistant 200mi arc from the meter fix. If an aircraft started the scenario inside this arc it 
is not included in the analysis. Also, the numbers reported here are miles above that 200mi minimum required travel 
distance. Next, the aircraft path distance requires that the aircraft travel through both experimental sectors, not just 
the single airspace sector, which is the focus of this paper. Therefore, it must be taken into account that another ATC 
managed the aircraft through their sector. However, this data agrees with other data and conclusions presented.  
As can be seen in Fig. 4, distance for the arrival aircraft travelling within the airspace in trial 16 (M = 14.34) is 
greater than the average number over the course of the rest of the experimental trials (M = 9.86). Again, this 
provides evidence for the assertion that trial 16 is more demanding than many of the other trials. The average 
distance aircraft 
travelled through the 
airspace for ATC Alpha 
(M = 11.22) is higher 
than that of ATC Zulu 
(M = 8.96). More 
specifically, and obvious 
in Fig. 4, the aircraft in 
trial 16 in ATC Alpha’s 
airspace travelled farther 
(M = 16.90) than in 
ATC Zulu’s airspace (M 
= 11.78), confirming the 
suspicion that in a 
higher workload 
environment, the 
strategy employed by 
ATC Zulu may be more 
efficient than the 
strategy employed by 
ATC Alpha.  
F. Workload Queries 
As mentioned in the Methods section of this paper, the subjective workload of participants is collected in two 
formats. First, the ATCs are asked to rate their own workload on a 1-6 scale every three minutes during the course of 
each trial. Second, after each trial the ATCs are asked to rate their workload for the trial on several different 
subscales, including: mental activity, time pressure, frustration, and overall success with aircraft separation. 
The real-time workload ratings over all trials show a difference between the two ATCs, such that ATC Alpha 
tended to give lower ratings (M = 2.70) than ATC Zulu (M = 3.46), F(1,632) = 140.64, p < .001. These differences 
Trial 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Aircraft path distance. This graph indicates the distance above 200 miles 
flown on average by aircraft for each trial and controller. Trial 16 shows greater 
distances flown and ATC Alpha’s aircraft also flew greater distances on average than 
ATC Zulu. 
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are likely a reflection of individual differences in the way ATCs correlate their own workload with a workload 
rating. Given these differences between the two controllers it may not be prudent to compare the online workload 
ratings directly between the controllers to come to any conclusions about strategy. Instead, comparing the difference 
between the average rating over the trials with each ATCs rating on trial 16 might show differences in the extra 
burden posed by the more demanding scenario. For ATC Alpha, the difference between the average rating and the 
trial 16 rating is .99, while 
the difference in average 
and trial 16 for ATC Zulu is 
.58. While the amount of 
increase for ATC Alpha is 
only .41 more than ATC 
Zulu’s increase, half a rating 
point on a 6-point scale may 
actually be substantial. 
Combined with the post-
trial workload ratings in the 
coming paragraphs, this 
may indicate that ATC Zulu 
had to make fewer 
adjustments in order to 
handle the increased 
demand from trial 16. 
The real-time workload 
ratings verify that trial 16 
was more difficult than the 
rest of the trials. A post-hoc 
analysis via an ANOVA, in 
Table 2, shows the ratings for both ATCs in trial 16 rated significantly higher than every other trial in the 
experiment, p < .05, with the exception of trial 14.  
On average ATC Alpha reports in the post-trial questionnaires a lower level of work (M = 4.82), lower level of 
time pressure (M = 3.88), lower level of frustration (M = 2.12), and a higher level of success (M = 5.94) than ATC 
Zulu (M = 5.59, 4.82, 2.47, 5.18, respectively). Given the differences reported for the real-time workload queries 
presented earlier, we can again assume these differences are a combination of currently unverifiable factors. 
Something that may be of interest though is the difference in the average rating for each controller and the rating 
given in trial 16. Table 3 shows that the level of work, time pressure, and frustration increased more in trial 16, 
compared with their average rating, for ATC 
Alpha than for ATC Zulu. Therefore, this data 
might seem to indicate that, regardless of 
individual reporting differences, the burden on 
ATC Alpha increases more with an increase in 
difficulty, compared to ATC Zulu.  
IV. Discussion 
The results suggest confirmation of the two primary assumptions; that the observed strategies for the two 
controllers, are indeed dissimilar, and that the trial chosen for ATC comparison imposed greater demand. While not 
intentionally implemented into the design of the study, post hoc differences are seen in the demand required to 
manage traffic between this trial and many of the other experimental trials. This is likely due to the actual scenario 
used in the trial. The scenario for trials 14 and 16 were unfamiliar to the participants prior to run 14.  
The differences in the ability of the two ATCs to manage aircraft during the more demanding situation, with the 
specific set of tools and automation provided may seem to suggest that these tools and the automation get in the way 
of allowing the controller to proficiently manage their tasks. However, it can largely be assumed that learning to 
become adept with advanced concepts, tools, and automation over the course of a week does not compare with the 
fundamental skills learned over the course of a career. Furthermore, ATC Alpha made a concerted effort to use the 
tools. Alpha likely felt the urge to help researchers evaluate the new tools, concepts, and automation. ATC Zulu on 
the other hand was quick to lean on tried and true techniques. If a controller manages aircraft similarly in multiple 
 Mean Difference Standard Error Significance 
Trial 16 
Trial 1 .526
*
 .165 .002 
Trial 2 .982
*
 .168 .000 
Trial 3 .396
*
 .166 .018 
Trial 4 1.130
*
 .166 .000 
Trial 5 .618
*
 .166 .000 
Trial 6 1.026
*
 .165 .000 
Trial 7 .693
*
 .166 .000 
Trial 8 1.395
*
 .165 .000 
Trial 9 .711
*
 .165 .000 
Trial 10 1.158
*
 .165 .000 
Trial 11 .455
*
 .166 .006 
Trial 12 1.079
*
 .165 .000 
Trial 13 .868
*
 .165 .000 
Trial 14 .217 .169 .200 
Trial 15 .399
*
 .168 .018 
Trial 17 .789
*
 .165 .000 
Table 2. Real-time workload ratings. This table indicates a difference in 
workload between Trial 16 and most other trials.*Significant at .05 level. 
ATC work time pressure frustration success 
Alpha 2.18 2.12 1.88 -1.94 
Zulu .41 .18 -.47 -1.18 
Table 3. Post-trial workload ratings. This table indicates 
the amount of difference in the ratings given in Trial 16 
compared with the averages for the rest of the trials. 
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experiments, regardless of tools, concepts, etc., then arguably that controller is going to be better able to manage 
sector traffic, and perform more consistently, than the controller who tries to use the different tools and concepts that 
accompany each experiment. This is certainly not always going to be the case, but is a consideration for the current 
experiment. The tool user may even become less practiced in the fundamental techniques they had traditionally used 
to manage airspace during their professional careers. An effort to understand these implications this might be 
possible, for example, by comparing conditions in which the controllers are forced to use the automation and 
advanced tools often, and in which they are allowed to manage aircraft using more familiar techniques and 
strategies. 
More than just comparing the difference in strategy between the two controllers during the high demand 
situation, it is also useful to compare each ATCs own strategies between less and more demanding situations. How 
each controller handles and adapts to the increased difficulty is likely to inform our understanding of controller 
strategy during demanding situations as much as comparing the difference in strategy between controllers during 
those times. When the demand increased, even the tool using controller deferred to manual control. Under time 
pressure, manual control results in quicker action than using the route planning tools and taking into account the 
suggestions of the automation. Instead of only relying on manual control when demand increases, one suggestion is 
to provide controllers with just enough information, in the form of automatically generated solutions, to quickly, 
safely, and efficiently manage aircraft delay times manually to a meter fix when their workload is high.  
The ability to switch strategies based on demand is a skill worth training, especially in the NextGen air traffic 
management environment. Both controllers were able to adjust techniques and strategies of control once the trial 
became more difficult, although with different levels of effectiveness. An emphasis should be placed in training 
which eliminates the reliance on any one strategy. Working knowledge of the different traffic management 
techniques available to them, as well as when to effectively implement them will help to avoid potentially unsafe 
situations, and will certainly aid efficiency. 
One particular limitation of this exercise is that individual differences in the data are attributed to differences in 
strategy and tool use. However, individual differences caused by culture, personality, intelligence, etc. will play a 
big factor in the results, especially when only comparing two individuals. Therefore, future work intended to dig 
deeper into this subject would benefit greatly from recruiting more individuals. It is possible, however, to revisit 
previous experiments with the intention of comparing the strategies of individual controllers managing identical 
airspace. 
The combination of all the information presented here helps to update understanding of automation and tool 
design and implementation for use in environments which exemplify not only high demand, but also user strategy 
changes based on dynamic events and situations. This increased understanding can also help to inform methods of 
training for proficiency in said environments. With the increased usage of automation and advanced tools in the air 
traffic management setting, either tools and the implementation of automation need to dynamically adapt to people 
and situations or training methods need to adapt to allow different people to use the same tool proficiently and 
effectively, or both.  
Appendix 
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